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ABSTRACT
Formal methods have provided approaches for investigating software engineering fundamentals and
also have high potential to improve current practices in dependability assurance. In this article,
we summarise known strengths and weaknesses of formal methods. From the perspective of the
assurance of robots and autonomous systems (RAS), we highlight new opportunities for integrated
formal methods and identify threats to the adoption of such methods. Based on these opportunities
and threats, we develop an agenda for fundamental and empirical research on integrated formal
methods and for successful transfer of validated research to RAS assurance. Furthermore, we outline
our expectations on useful outcomes of such an agenda.
Keywords Formal methods · strengths · weaknesses · opportunities · threats · SWOT · challenges · integration ·
unification · research agenda · robots and autonomous systems
Acronyms
AI artificial intelligence
ASIL automotive safety integrity level
DA dependability assurance
DAL design assurance level
DSE dependable systems engineering
DSL domain-specific language
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FI formal inspection
FM formal method
HCI human-computer interaction
iFM integrated formal method
IT information technology
MBD model-based development
MDE model-driven engineering
ML machine learning
RAS robots and autonomous systems
RCA root cause analysis
RE requirements engineering
SACM Structured Assurance Case
Meta-model
SC systematic capability
SIL safety integrity level
SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theory
SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportu-
nities, and threats
SysML Systems Modelling Language
UML Unified Modelling Language
UTP Unifying Theories of Programming
1 Introduction
A plethora of difficulties in software practice and momentous software faults have been continuously delivering rea-
sons to believe that a significantly more rigorous discipline of software engineering is needed [101]. Researchers such
as Neumann [141] have collected plenty of anecdotal evidence on software-related risks substantiating this belief.
In dependable systems engineering, researchers have turned this belief into one of their working hypotheses and
contributed formalisms, techniques, and tools to increase the rigour in engineering workflows [101]. Examples of
activities where formalisms have been brought to bear include requirements engineering [e.g. 71], architecture design
and verification, test-driven development, program synthesis, and testing, to name a few. Formal methods (FMs) have
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been an active research area for decades, serving as powerful tools for theoretical researchers. As a paradigm to be
adopted by practitioners they have also been investigated by applied researchers. Applications of FMs have shown
their strengths but also their weaknesses [101, 125].
Based on observations contradicting the mentioned difficulties, Hoare [88] came to ask “How did software get so
reliable without proof?” He, and later MacKenzie [125], suggested that continuously improved design of program-
ming languages and compilers, defensive programming, inspection, and testing must have effectively prevented many
dangerous practices. MacKenzie coined the “Hoare paradox” stating that although proof was seldom used, software
had shown to be surprisingly fit for purpose. However, faced with software of increasing complexity (e.g. RAS),
MacKenzie pondered how long Hoare’s question will remain valid.
Indeed, recently we can observe a plethora of difficulties with robots and autonomous systems [112, 141]. Such
systems are set to be more broadly deployed in society, thereby increasing their level of safety criticality [70] and
requiring a stringent regulatory regime. A successful method for regulatory acceptance is provided by structured
assurance cases, which provide comprehensible and indefeasible safety arguments supported by evidence [72, 77, 104].
However, such assurance cases—whether or not compliant with standards like IEC 615081 and DO-178C2—can be
laborious to create, complicated to maintain and evolve, and must be rigorously checked by the evaluation process
to ensure that all obligations are met and confidence in the arguments is achieved [68, 160]. Nevertheless, these are
problems that FMs are designed to overcome.
In spite of the weaknesses of current FMs, and encouraged by their strengths, we believe that their coordinated use
within established processes can reduce critical deficits observable in dependable systems engineering. Farrell et al.
[45] state that “there is currently no general framework integrating formal methods for robotic systems”. The authors
highlight the use of what are called integrated formal methods (iFMs)3 in the construction of assurance cases and the
production of evidence as a key opportunity to meet current RAS challenges. Particularly, computer-assisted assurance
techniques [172], supported by evidence provided by iFMs, can greatly increase confidence in the sufficiency of
assurance cases, and also aid in their maintenance and evolution through automation. Moreover, the use of modern FM-
based tools to support holistic simulation, prototyping, and verification activities, at each stage of system, hardware,
and software development, can lead to systems that are demonstrably safe, secure, and trustworthy.
1.1 Contribution
We investigate the potentials for the wider adoption of integrated formal methods in dependable systems engineering,
taking robots and autonomous systems as a recent opportunity to foster research in such methods and to support their
successful transfer and application in practice.
We analyse the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of using formal methods in the assurance of de-
pendable systems such as RAS. For this analysis, we summarise experience reports on formal method transfer and
application.
Assuming that (a) integration enhances formal methods and (b) the assurance of robots and autonomous systems is
a branch of dependable systems engineering, Figure 1 shows how we derive an agenda for fundamental and applied
iFM research.
From the strengths, we see in recent research, and from the opportunities in current RAS assurance, we argue why
this domain is a key opportunity for iFMs. Particularly, we indicate how such methods can meet typical assurance
challenges that RASs are increasingly facing.
From the weaknesses, we observe in recent research, and from the threats formal method research transfer is exposed
to, we derive directions of foundational and empirical research to be taken to transfer iFMs into the assurance of
robots, autonomous systems, and other applications, and to use these methods to their maximum benefit.
Our analysis 1. elaborates on the analysis and conclusions of Hoare et al. [90], 2. extends their suggestions with regard
to formal method experimentation and empirical evidence of effectiveness focusing on collaboration between formal
method researchers and practitioners, and 3. develops a research and research transfer road map, placing emphasis on
RASs.
1For: Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems.
2For: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.
3We reuse the term from the homonymous conference series [4].
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Figure 1: RAS assurance as an opportunity for the wider adoption of iFMs in dependable systems practice
1.2 Overview
We provide some background including terminology (Section 2.1) and related work (Section 2.2) in the following.
Then, we carry through an analysis of strengths, weaknesses (Section 3), opportunities (Section 4), and threats (Sec-
tion 5) of iFMs for RAS assurance. Based on this analysis, we formulate our hypotheses (Section 6), pose research
questions based on these hypotheses, derive a research agenda, and specify some outcomes we expect from this
agenda (Section 7).
2 Background
This section introduces the core terminology used throughout this article, and provides a discussion of other surveys
of the FM state of the art and a summary of similar positions and agendas.
2.1 Terminology
For the sake of clarity among readers of different provenance, we restrict the meaning of some terms we use in the
following and introduce convenient abbreviations.
We view robots and autonomous systems as both dependable systems and highly automated machines capable of
achieving a variety of complex tasks in support of humans. We can consider such systems by looking at four layers:
the plant or process composed of the operational environment and the machine; the machine itself; the machine’s
controller, and the software embedded into this controller. Based on these layers, we treat “embedded system” and
“embedded software” as synonyms. Machine, controller, and software can all be distributed.
By dependable systems engineering, we refer to error-avoidance and error-detection activities in control system and
embedded software development (e.g. according to the V-model). Avizienis et al. [7] devised a comprehensive termi-
nology and an overview of the assessment and handling of a variety of faults, errors, and failures. For critical systems,
such activities are expected to be explicit (e.g. traceable, documented), to employ best practices (e.g. design patterns),
and to be driven by reasonably qualified personnel (e.g. well-trained and experienced engineers or programmers).
The need for dependability often arises from the embedding of software into a cyber-physical context (i.e., an elec-
tronic execution platform, a physical process to be controlled, and other systems or human users to interact with).
Dependability assurance (DA), or assurance for short, encompasses the usually cross-disciplinary task of providing
evidence for an assurance case (e.g. safety, security, reliability) for a system in a specific operational context [104].
By formal methods, we refer to the use of formal (i.e., mathematically precise and unambiguous) modelling languages
to describe system elements, such as software, hardware, and the environment, and the subjection of models written in
these languages to analysis [101, 125], the results of which are targeted at assurance [31, 159]. FMs always require the
use of both formal syntax and formal semantics (i.e., the mapping of syntax into a mathematical structure). Semantics
that allows the verification of refinement or conformance across different FMs is said to be unifying [89, 168]. iFMs
allow the coordinated application of several potentially heterogeneous FMs, supported by interrelated layers of formal
semantics [14, 69].
FMs stand in contrast to informal methods, which employ artefacts without a formal syntax or semantics, such as
natural language descriptions and requirements. In the gap between informal methods and FMs there is also a variety
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of semi-formal methods, including languages like the Unified Modelling Language (UML) and the Systems Modelling
Language (SysML), whose syntax and semantics have frequently been subject of formalisation in research [e.g. 20,
54, 153, 175].
FM-based tools assist in the modelling and reasoning based on a FM. Model-based development (MBD) and model-
driven engineering (MDE) served many opportunities for FM-based tools to be applied in dependable systems prac-
tice [12, 177].4
We speak of applied or practical FMs to signify successful applications of FMs in a practical context, for example,
to develop embedded control software deployed in a commercial product marketed by an industrial company. We
consider the use of FMs in research projects still as FM research. Empirical FM research investigates practical FMs,
for example using surveys, case studies, or controlled field experiments [65]. We speak of FM transfer if FM research
is transferred into practice with the aim to effectively apply and practice FMs. We consider FM transfer, as discussed
below, as crucial for empirical FM research and progress of iFM research.
2.2 Related Work
Many researchers have suggested that FMs will, in one way or another, play a key role in mastering the difficulties
discussed below and in achieving the desired guarantees (e.g. dependability, security, performance) of future critical
systems [e.g. 101, 125].
Expecting an increased use of FMs to solve practical challenges in the mid 1990s, Clarke and Wing [31] suggested
FM integration, tool development, and continuous specialist training to foster successful FM transfer to practice.
In 2000, van Lamsweerde [169] observed a growing number of FM success stories in requirements engineering. Eval-
uating several FM paradigms, he outlined weaknesses (e.g. isolation of languages, poor guidance) to be compensated
and challenges to be met towards effective FM use, particularly their integration into multi-paradigm specification
languages.
Aiming at the improvement of software dependability, Jackson et al. [96] made several key observations of recent
dependability practice (e.g. lack of evidence for method effectiveness) leading to a general proposal with broad
implications: rigorous dependability cases with explicit claims, the support of reuse and evolution, and the selective
use of FMs. Additionally, these authors provide a number of recommendations to tool vendors and organisations in
education and research.
Also in the mid 2000s, Hinchey et al. [84] spotted a decline of internet software dependability in the context of
an increased level of concurrency in such systems. Their observation was backed by an earlier comparative soft-
ware/hardware dependability discussion by Gray and Brewer [66]. Hinchey et al. highlighted achievements in FM
automation enabling an increased use of lightweight FMs in “software engineers’ usual development environments”.
Furthermore, they stressed the ability to use several FMs in a combined manner to verify distributed (embedded)
systems, avoid errors and, hence, stop the decline of software dependability.
Hoare et al. [90] issued a manifesto for a “Verified Software Initiative”. Based on a consensus of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats in the software engineering community, they proposed a long-term international “research
program towards the construction of error-free software systems”. This initiative aims to achieve its agenda through
(1) new theoretical insights into software development, (2) creation of novel automated FM tools, and (3) a collection
of experiments and benchmarks. In particular, the initiative is driven by a number of “grand challenges” [176]—
difficult practical verification problems that can guide future research. The experiments have broad scope, and include
a smart cash card [166] (the Mondex card), a secure entry system5 (Tokeneer), and a cardiac pacemaker.6
Outlining an agenda for FM transfer, Jhala et al. [99] raised the need for improved benchmarks, metrics, and infrastruc-
ture for experimental evaluation, the need for revised teaching and training curricula [150], and the need for research
communities interested in engaging with practitioners and working on ways to scale FMs up to large systems and to
increase the usability of FMs. The authors specified several applications with great opportunities for FM transfer.
Applied researchers and practitioners interviewed by Schaffer and Voas [162] convey an optimistic picture of FM
adoption in practice, highlighting the potentials to improve IT security, particularly in cyber-physical systems. Chong
et al. [29] share the view that FMs are the most promising approach towards acceptably dependable and secure systems.
4The SCADE Design Verifier (http://www.esterel-technologies.com) and the seL4 microkernel (http://sel4.systems) represent
good although less recent examples.
5Tokeneer Project Website: https://www.adacore.com/tokeneer.
6Pacemaker Formal Methods Challenge: http://www.cas.mcmaster.ca/sqrl/pacemaker.htm.
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The challenges they list for the security domain are similar to the challenges we perceive in RAS assurance: FM
integration, sound abstraction techniques, compositional guarantees, and evidence for sustainable transfer.
With their survey of FMs for RAS verification, Luckcuck et al. [122] identified difficulties of applying FMs in the
robotics domain and summarised research results and their limitations. They conclude (i) that formalisation remains
the most critical and most difficult task, (ii) that the surveyed approaches do not provide “sufficient evidence for public
trust and certification”, and (iii) that iFMs would be highly desirable if the current lack of translations between the
most relevant of the surveyed techniques (e.g. model checking) could be overcome. We complement their observations
with a further analysis of the lack of unification of FMs and of the missing empirical evidence for the effectiveness of
FMs and iFMs. Additionally, we provide a research road map.
3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Formal Methods for Assurance
Following the guidelines for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis by Piercy and Giles
[152], we provide an overview of strengths and weaknesses of FMs, regarding
• reputation, proof culture, education, training, and use (Section 3.1),
• transfer efforts (Section 3.2),
• evidence of effectiveness (Section 3.3),
• expressivity (Section 3.4), and
• integration and coordination (Section 3.5).
3.1 Reputation, Proof Culture, Education, Training, and Use
In the guest editor’s introduction of the “50 Years of Software Engineering” IEEE Software special theme issue [41],
the question
“Are formal methods essential, or even useful, or are they just an intellectual exercise that gets
in the way of building real-world systems?”
invited us to deliberate on this topic and summarise its highlights. Applied researchers have raised the issue of limited
effectiveness and productivity of FMs, particularly in large practical systems with changing requirements [55, 146].
FMs are known to be difficult to apply in practice, and bad communication between theorists and practitioners sustains
the issue that FMs are taught but rarely applied [55]. In contrast, they are considered to have significant potential to
cope with the toughest recent engineering problems: certifiable RAS assurance [45].
Studying the sociology of proof, MacKenzie [125] identified three sources of knowledge about a system’s depend-
ability: induction (i.e., from observation), authority (e.g. expert opinion), and deduction (i.e., inference from models)
which is possibly the most powerful. Since the beginning of software engineering there has been a debate on the
style of deductive reasoning about programs and on the usefulness of FMs. De Millo et al. [35] argued that proof
is a social process. Long and difficult to read computer-produced verification evidence cannot be subject to such a
process and is not genuine proof. Dijkstra [38] countered, albeit not as a supporter of mechanisation, to change from
a personal trust-based culture of proof to the formalisation of proof steps. Fetzer [48] doubted that verification based
on a model of the program can yield any knowledge about the dependability of an implementation of that program.
According to Naur [139], it is not the degree of formalisation making a proof convincing but the way the argument
is organised. MacKenzie tried to arbitrate this debate between rigorous proof in ordinary mathematics and formal
mechanised proof. He suggested that proof assistants have the potential to use formal methods [101] to the maximum
benefit. Daylight [34] concluded from a discussion with Tony Hoare that formalist and empiricist perspectives, while
still causing controversies between research and practice, complement each other in a fruitful way.
Nevertheless, FMs have shown to be well-suited to substantially improve modelling precision, requirements clarity,
and verification confidence. FM applications in requirements engineering such as the “Software Cost Reduction” tool
set [83] even carry the hypothesis of FM cost-effectiveness in its name. By the 1990s, FM researchers had already
started to examine FM usefulness with the aim to respond to critical observations of practitioners [9, 16, 73, 110, 120].
Some of these efforts culminated in empirical studies [151, 163] suggesting high error detection effectiveness, though
with some controversy also caused by employed research designs [11, 164].
Jones and Bonsignour [100, Sec. 3.2, Tab. 3.2] observe that the combination of formal7 inspection, static analysis, and
formal testing has been the best approach to defect preventionwith up to 99% of accumulated defect removal efficiency.
7 “Formal” refers to the formality of the procedure but does not imply the use of formal semantics or mathematical techniques.
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FMs can be seen as a rigorous and systematic form of this approach, though less often applied. In Appendix A,
we make a brief excursion to the relationship between FMs and formal inspection and try to roughly estimate the
population size of FM users.
From two larger surveys, one in the early 1990s [6] and another one in the late 2000s [12, 177], we obtain a more
comprehensive picture of the typical advantages of FM use and barriers to FM adoption as seen by practitioners and
practical FM researchers. In two recent surveys [59, 60], we made two, not necessarily surprising but empirically sup-
ported, observations underpinning the main findings of the former studies: many practitioners view FMs as promising
instruments with high potential, and would use these instruments to their maximumbenefit, whether directly or through
FM-based tools. However, the beneficial use of FMs is still hindered by severe obstacles (e.g. FMs are considered hard
to learn, difficult to integrate in existing processes, too expensive, prone to invalid abstractions, difficult to maintain).
Strength 1 FMs can improve RAS modelling, the specification of RAS requirements, and the automation of RAS
verification, fostering the early detection of systematic errors in RAS designs. Many assurance practitioners
perceive FM usefulness as positive.
Weakness 1 FMs have shown to be difficult to learn and apply. Many assurance practitioners perceive the ease
of use of FMs as negative. Moreover, research has been ineffectively communicated in FM teaching and training.
3.2 Transfer Efforts
FMs can be effective in two ways, ab-initio (i.e., before implementation) and post-facto (i.e., after implementation).
The ab-initio use of FMs aims at reducing late error costs through, for example, formal prototyping, step-wise re-
finement, formal test-driven development, crafting module assertions prior to programming, or formal contract-based
development. Once an initial formalisation (e.g. invariants) is available, it is argued for families of similar systems
that, from the second or third FM application onward, the benefit of having the formalisation outperforms the cumula-
tive effort to maintain the formalisation up to an order of magnitude [96, 129, 130]. This argument also addresses agile
settings inasmuch as iterations or increments refer to similar systems. The post-facto use of FMs can occur through
knowledge extraction from existing artefacts and using automated tools such as, for example, formal or model-based
post-facto testing tools or post-facto use of code assertion checkers [103, 118]. Overall, the second way of utilising
FMs is known to be more compatible with everyday software practice.
Achievements collected by Aichernig and Maibaum [2], Boulanger [15], and Gnesi and Margaria [62] show that
many researchers have been working towards successful FM transfer. Moreover, researchers experienced in particular
FMs draw positive conclusions from FM applications, especially in scaling FMs through adequate tool support for
continuous reasoning in agile software development [131, 142]. Other researchers report about progress in theorem
proving of system software of industrial size [e.g. 107] and about FM-based tools for practical use [e.g. 12, 103, 149].
MBD and MDE have a history of wrapping FMs into software tools to make access to formalisms easier and to help
automating tedious tasks via domain-specific languages (DSLs) and visual notations.
Static (program) analysis is another branch where FM-based tools have been successfully practised [e.g. 103]. How-
ever, few static analysis tools are based on FMs and many of these tools are exposed to reduced effectiveness because
of high false-positive rates, particularly if settings are not perfectly adjusted to the corresponding project [58].
Furthermore, the concolic testing technique [63], a post-facto FM, has seen multiple successes in industry [64, 105]. It
exercises all possible execution paths of a program through systematic permutation of a sequence of branch conditions
inferred by an instrumented concrete execution. It uses these symbolic execution paths and Satisfiability Modulo
Theory (SMT) solving to obtain a series of inputs that exercise the full range of program paths. It does not depend on a
predefined model of the program, but effectively infers one based on the branch conditions. It can therefore readily be
used on existing program developments, and has notably been used by Samsung for verification of their flash storage
platform software [105]. Indeed, it is a belief of the authors of this latter work that post-facto methods provide greater
opportunities for adoption of FMs in industry.
Recently, there have been several developments in the use of FMs to assure safety requirements related to human-
computer interaction (HCI), and a growing body of literature [76, 144, 173], particularly relating to certification
of commercial medical devices [17, 126]. There, formal methods have been shown to be successful in facilitating
regulatory acceptance, for example with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) agency in the United States. Masci
et al. [126] formalised the FDA regulatory safety requirements for the user interface of a patient-controlled infusion
pump, and used the PVS proof assistant to verify it. Bowen and Reeves [17], similarly, formally modelled an infusion
pump interface, using the Z notation, and then used the resulting specification as an oracle to generate test cases.
Harrison et al. [75] performed risk analysis for a new neonatal dialysis machine, formalised safety requirements, and
use these requirements to analyse and verify the source code. The consensus of these authors is that FMs can greatly
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reduce the defects in safety critical HCI prior to deployment. The techniques are increasingly practically applicable
through greater automation. Moreover, it is likely that these results have potential applications in other domains, such
as RAS, provided they can be transferred and scale to this greater complexity.
Strength 2 There exist many transfer re-entry points from a range of insightful FM case studies in industrial and
academic labs. FMs were demonstrated to be a useful basis for many static analysis and MDE tools.
Weakness 2 The number of practical (comparative) case studies using (ab-initio) FMs or iFMs, particularly on
RASs, is still too low to draw useful and firm conclusions on FM effectiveness.
3.3 Evidence of Effectiveness
Whether used as ab-initio or post-facto tools, strong evidence for the efficacy of FMs in practice is still scarce [e.g.
151] and more anecdotal [e.g. 2, 15, 62, 162], rarely drawn from comparative studies [e.g. 151, 163], often primarily
conducted in research labs [e.g. 30, 52], or not recent enough to reflect latest achievements in verification tool re-
search [e.g. 28]. We observe that a large fraction of empirical evidence for FM effectiveness can be classified as level
6 or 7 according to [65, Tab. 2], that is, too weak to draw effective conclusions.
Jackson et al. [96, p. 39] as well as Jones and Bonsignour [100, Sec. 4.4, p. 220], two researchers from the software
engineering measurement community, support this observation. Jones and Bonsignour state that “there is very little
empirical data on several topics that need to be well understood if proofs of correctness are to become useful tools
for professional software development as opposed to academic experiments”. Moreover, the controversies about proof
culture summarised in Section 3.1 contain little data to resolve practitioners’ doubts.
Graydon [67] observed this lack of evidence of FM effectiveness in assurance argumentation. More generally, Rae
et al. [154] noticed insufficiently evaluated safety research. About 86% of works lack guidance to reproduce results,
hence forming a barrier to the advancement of safety practice. Although their study is limited to one conference series,
it indicates deficiencies in the evaluation of DA research. Overall, it is important to understand that the mentioned lack
of evidence and successful transfer produces great opportunities for further empirical and theoretical FM research.
Strength 3 For (comparative) studies of FM effectiveness, there are several research designs and benchmark ex-
amples available from the scientific literature. In Appendix A, we assess the effort and feasibility of corresponding
qualitative and quantitative studies.
Weakness 3 FMs have been suffering from fragile effectiveness and productivity in dependability engineering
in general. There is a lack of convincing evidence of FM effectiveness, particularly, of ab-initio FMs. RAS
engineering and assurance are likely to be affected by these weaknesses.
3.4 Expressivity
An often quoted weakness of MBD, particularly when applied to RASs, is the “reality gap” [21, 97] that can exist
between a naively constructed model and its corresponding real-world artefact. According to Brooks [21], over-
reliance on simulation to test behaviour using naive and insufficiently validated models can lead to effort being applied
to solving problems that do not exist in the real world. Worse, programs for robotic controllers developed in a model-
based setting may fail when executed on real-world hardware, because “it is very hard to simulate the actual dynamics
of the real-world” [21]. This problem is not only true of simulation, but any form of model-based analysis, including
reasoning in FMs [48].
The fundamental problem here is that it is impossible to model the behaviour of any physical entity precisely [117],
unless we replicate the original. Moreover, as models become more detailed, their utility decreases and they can
become just as difficult to comprehend and analyse as their real-world counterparts, an observation highlighted by
the famous paradox of Bonini [13]. Nevertheless, as statistician George Box said “all models are wrong but some
are useful” [19]: we must evaluate a model not upon how “correct” it is, or how much detail it contains, but on
how informative it is. According to Lee and Sirjani [117], the antidote is not to abandon the use of models, but to
recognise their inherent limitations and strengths, and apply them intelligently to reasoning about a specific problem.
This means selecting appropriate modelling paradigms that enable specification of behaviour at a sufficiently detailed
level of abstraction, and using the resulting models to guide the engineering process.
Strength 4 FMs allow and foster the use of specific abstractions to specifically inform engineers of RAS proper-
ties critical for their assurance.
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Weakness 4 The effectiveness of formal models is fragile and can be significantly reduced because of uncontrol-
lable gaps between models and their implementations.
3.5 Integration and Coordination
Modelling notations usually employ a particular paradigm to abstract the behaviour of the real-world. For example,
the state-based paradigm, employed by FMs like Z [165], B [1], and refinement calculus [8, 136], considers how
the internal state of a system evolves, whilst the event-driven paradigm, employed in process calculi like CSP [86],
CCS [132], and pi-calculus [133], considers how behaviour may be influenced by external interactions. Consequently,
individual formal methods are usually limited to considering only certain aspects or views of a system’s behaviour [26,
145], which can limit their effectiveness when used in isolation. Many researchers have therefore sought to overcome
this weakness by FM integration [26, 31, 53, 145].
The 1990s saw a large number of works on semantic unification and method integration [53, 145]. Theoretical foun-
dations were provided by Hehner, in his seminal work on semantic unification using the “programs-as-predicates”
approach [79, 80] and comparative semantics [82]. At the same time, refinement calculi were developed [8, 136, 137]
that would underlie the work on linking heterogeneous notations through abstraction. Also, Woodcock and Morgan
[178] explored the integration of state- and event-based modelling using weakest preconditions, and several other
works on this topic followed [42, 51, 157]. Hoare proposed a unified theory of programming [87] that links together
the three semantic styles: denotational, operational, and algebraic. These developments culminated in Hoare and He’s
Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP) [89], a general framework for integration of semantically heterogeneous
notations by application of Hehner and Hoare’s approach [81] to the formalisation of a catalogue of computational
paradigms, with links between them formalised using Galois connections. This framework enables a definitive so-
lution to the integration of states and events, along with other computational paradigms, in the CIRCUS language
family [27, 143, 171].
Another result of these developments was a number of seminal works on FM integration [26, 53, 145]. Paige, inspired
by work on systematic method integration [113], defined a generic “meta-method” that aimed at integration of several
formal and semi-formal methods using notational translations with a common predicative semantic foundation, which
builds on Hehner’s work [80]. Meanwhile, Galloway and Stoddart [53], building on their previous work [51], likewise
proposed the creation of hybrid FMs with a multi-paradigm approach. Moreover, Broy and Slotosch [26] proposed
that FMs should be integrated into the V-Model of development [92] with common semantic foundations to link the
various artefacts across development steps.
These diverse efforts eventually led to the founding of the iFM conference series in 1999 [4], with the aim of develop-
ing theoretical foundations for “combining behavioural and state-based formalisms”. For the second iteration of the
iFM conference [69], the scope broadened to consider all the different aspects of FM integration, including semantic
integration, traceability, tool integration, and refinement. A few years later, a conference series was also established for
UTP [39], with the aim of continuing to develop unifying semantics for diverse notations within the UTP framework.
However, there is as yet no agreed and general methodology for integrating FMs that could be applied to RASs [45].
Overall, integration is of particular pertinence to RASs, since such systems are multi-layered and possess a high degree
of semantic heterogeneity. As Farrell et al. found, they “can be variously categorised as embedded, cyber-physical,
real-time, hybrid, adaptive and even autonomous systems, with a typical robotic system being likely to contain all of
these aspects”. When we consider RASs, we must consider advanced computational paradigms like real-time, hybrid
computation with differential equations, probability, and rigid body dynamics. This implies the use of several different
modelling languages and paradigms to describe the different aspects, and therefore a variety of analysis techniques to
assure properties of the overall system. Assurance of autonomous systems will certainly therefore require iFMs [45].
Figure 1 on page 3 summarises this relationship.
Strength 5 iFMs raise the potential of integration and coordination of several FMs to consistently reason about
RAS properties implemented by a combination of various technologies such as software, electronic hardware,
and mechanical hardware.
Weakness 5 There is currently no agreed framework for the integration of FMs that would effectively address
the needs in the RAS domain or similar domains.
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4 Opportunities for Integrated Formal Methods
This section continues with the environmental part of our SWOT analysis. Several key opportunities for the transfer
of iFMs arise from ongoing assurance challenges, particularly in RAS assurance and from looking at what other
disciplines do to cope with similar challenges. In the following, we describe opportunities stemming from
• the desire for early removal of severe errors (Section 4.1),
• the desire to learn from accidents and their root causes (Section 4.2),
• the desire of assurance to form a mature discipline (Section 4.3), and
• the desire for adequate and dependable norms (Section 4.4).
4.1 The Desire for Early Removal of Severe Errors
Summarising major challenges in automotive systems engineering in 2006, Broy [22, p. 39] indicated that modelling
languages used in practice were often not formalised and the desired benefits could not be achieved from semi-formal
languages. Moreover, software engineering was not well integrated with core control and mechanical engineering
processes. Domain engineers would produce software/hardware sub-systems and mechanical sub-assemblies in unde-
sirable isolation. Broy referred to a lack of iFMs for overall architecture verification.
Has the situation changed since then? In model-centric development in embedded software practice (e.g. based on
UML or SysML), drawbacks can be significant if methods and tools are not well integrated or trained personnel are
missing [119]. Likely, Broy’s criticism remains in contemporary automatic vehicle engineering and assurance practice.
In fact, he has a recent, clearly negative, but not pessimistic answer to this question [24]. Moreover, this view is shared
by the Autonomy Assurance International Programme’s discussion of assurance barriers,8 that is, current challenges
in RAS assurance. These barriers (e.g. validation, verification, risk acceptance, simulation, human-robot interaction)
could be addressed by formal engineering models and calculations based on such models to be used as evidence in
assurance cases.
Model-based assurance [72, 77] uses system models to structure assurance cases and represents another opportunity
for formal methods in (through-life) assurance. Assurance arguments that are purely informal can be difficult to
evaluate, and may be subject to argumentation fallacies [68]. Consequently, there have been a number of efforts to
formalise and mechanise assurance cases, both at the argumentation level [37, 161] and the evidence level [32]. More
recently, in MDE, the Structured Assurance Case Meta-model (SACM)9 is a standardised meta-model that supports
both structured argumentation and integration of evidence from diverse system models [172]. SACM unifies several
existing argumentation notations, and also provides support for artefact traceability and terminology. It could, in the
future, serve as a crucial component for iFMs in assurance.
Leading voices from applied software engineering research periodically mention the role of FMs as a key technology
to master upcoming challenges in assuring critical software systems [135]. A round table about the adoption of
FMs in IT security [162] positively evaluated their overall suitability, the combination of FMs with testing, and the
achievements in FM automation. The panellists noticed limitations of FMs in short-time-to-market projects and in
detecting unknown vulnerabilities as well as shortcomings in FM training and adoption in practice.
However, even for mission-critical systems, high costs from late defect removal and long defect repair cycles [100], as
well as dangerous and fatal10 incidents indicate that assurance in some areas is still driven by practices failing to assist
engineers in overcoming their challenges. Moreover, Neumann, an observer of a multitude of computing risks, stated
that “the needs for better safety, reliability, security, privacy, and system integrity that I highlighted 24 years ago in my
book, Computer-Related Risks, are still with us in one form or another today” [47, 91, 140].
For example, artificial intelligence software—particularly machine learning (ML) components—has been developed
at a high pace and used in many non-critical applications. Recently, ML components are increasingly deployed in
critical domains. For verification and error removal, such software has to be transparent and explainable. Preferring
verifiable algorithms to heuristics, Parnas [147] recalled the corresponding engineering principle: “We cannot trust
a device unless we know how it works”. One way to follow this principle and establish transparency is to reverse
engineer (i.e., to decode) the functionality of an ML component even if this is not possible in general [10]. FMs can
8See https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/body-of-knowledge/.
9See https://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/About-SACM/.
10For example, the fatal accident involving a Tesla advanced driving assistance system,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/07/tesla-fatal-crash-silicon-valley-autopilot-mode-report.
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help extract knowledge and reverse engineer abstractions of ML systems to explain their behaviour. We might then ask
to which extent the reverse engineered and verified functionality serves as a substitute for the original ML component.
These anecdotes make it reasonable to question current assurance practice. Seen through the eyes of assurance,
they suggest that we might again be facing a dependable software engineering crisis similar to the one from the late
1960s [24, 156].
Opportunity 1 We as method researchers could learn from this crisis and improve the way that FMs can be
effectively coordinated to support early error removal in practical engineering processes. We as practitioners
could learn from this crisis and improve the way that we correctly engineer and certify highly automated systems
such as robots and autonomous systems.
4.2 The Desire to Learn From Accidents and Their Root Causes
In the title of Section 4.1, the word “severe” refers to the negative consequences potentially caused by errors we want
to remove using iFMs. The more severe the potential consequences of an error, the more critical is its early removal.
The usefulness of iFMs thus positively correlates with their support in the removal of critical errors. However, the
estimation of severity often also requires the careful study of past field incidents [93].
We speak of field incidents to refer to significant operational events in the field (i.e., the environment a technical
system is operated) which are undesired because of their safety risks and their severe harmful consequences. Field
incidents range from minor incidents to major accidents. It is important to separate the observed effect, the field
incident, from its causes or, more precisely, from the causal chains of events leading to the observed effect. Hence,
this analysis depends on the considered system perimeter [e.g. 7]. Depending on the possibilities of observation and
the depth pursued in a root cause analysis (RCA), a conclusion on a possible cause can result in any combination
of, for example, overall system failure, human error, adverse environmental condition, design fault, hardware fault,
software fault, or specification error.11
There are many databases about field incidents: some are comprehensive and include RCA, others are less detailed,
and some are confidential, depending on the regulations in the corresponding application domain or industry sector.
Based on such databases, accident research, insurance, and consumer institutions occasionally provide brief root cause
statistics along with accident statistics.12
Accident statistics allow certain predictions of the safety of systems and their operation, for example whether risk has
been and will be acceptably low. Such statistics are also used in estimations of the amount of field testing necessary13
to sufficiently reduce risk [102].
For example, it is well-acknowledged that inadequately designed and implemented user interfaces are a significant
contributory factor in computer-related accidents [112, 114, 124]. But how and how fast have we arrived at this
conclusion and how can we prevent future such incidents? Without proper empirical investigation of accident causes,
such statistics are of little use in decisions on measures for accident prevention [94], particularly on improvements of
engineering processes, methods (e.g. iFMs), and technologies (e.g. iFM tools) used to build these systems. For this,
we require more in-depth, possibly formal, RCAs and statistics that relate error removal by iFMs and incident root
causes. To this extent, RCA is a great opportunity for the investigation of iFM effectiveness.
MacKenzie [124] reported about deficiencies of information gathering (e.g. RCA) for databases on computer-related
accidents back in the early 1990s. He noted that independent, well-known, but confidential databases might reduce
under-reporting and were thus believed to improve safety culture. Reporting has not much improved as observed by
Jackson et al. [96, p. 39]. To understand the current RCA situation, we studied a sample of 377 reports from open field
incident databases (in aviation, automotive, rail, energy, and others) finding the following [60]:
1. RCAs in these reports were of poor quality, either because they were not going deep enough, economically
or technically infeasible, or inaccessible to us.
2. Particularly, root causes (e.g. software faults, specification errors) were rarely documented in a way that
useful information about the technologies used (e.g. software) or consequences in the development process
could be retrieved from the reports.
11Specification errors are also called development failures [7] and can be seen as flaws in the process of requirements validation.
12See [56, Sec. 1.1] for a list of accident databases from such institutions.
13For example, according to “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” or “So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable”. See
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcheck.htm: “Something is reasonably practicable unless its costs are grossly dispropor-
tionate to the benefits.”
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3. Reports in some sectors (e.g. aerospace, rail, power plants, process industry) contain more in-depth RCAs
than others (e.g. automotive) because of different regulations.
4. Some sectors operate official databases (e.g. NHTSA14 and NTSB15 in the US transportation sector) and
others do not (e.g. German road transportation sector).
5. Our findings suggest that even in domains with regulated RCA, reports in open databases tend to be less
informative than reports in closed databases.
6. The reports from the automotive industry exhibited a relatively small fraction of technology-related er-
rors (e.g. software-related errors).
To validate our study and to better understand the context of our findings, we interviewed eight16 safety experts [60].
One finding was that, because of an unclear separation of technologies and a lack of explicit architectural knowledge,
a desirable classification of root causes is sometimes infeasible. Hence, accident analysts often close their reports
with a level of detail too low to draw helpful conclusions. Additionally, one expert stated that the hidden number
of software-related or software-caused field incidents in dependable systems practice is likely much larger than the
known number. This matches our intuition but we are missing clear evidence.
Ladkin, a researcher involved in the further development of IEC 61508, demands regulations to mandate the use of
systematic RCAs.17 In support of his view, we believe that rigorous in-depth RCAs based on iFMs can be helpful to
gain clarity about actual root causes. Again, beyond this undesirable form of late error removal, RCA data is essential
for the measurement of the effectiveness of error removal techniques, particularly iFMs.
The “Toyota unintended acceleration” incident exemplifies the difficulty of drawing conclusions without using pow-
erful RCA techniques: a first RCA concluded that floor mats and sticky throttle pedals caused a fatal car mishap.
A second RCA carried out by NASA experts and based on testing and automated static analysis of the control sys-
tem (i.e., software and hardware) was not conclusive. A third RCA18 based on code reviews—we could not find out
which level of formal inspection was used—detected defects in the control software and safety architecture, demon-
strated to be likely the causes of the accident [111].
Opportunity 2 We could invest in integrated formal methods for RCA based on standardised data recording (e.g.
aircraft black boxes), especially important for RASs where human operators cannot practically perform incident
response. Based on lessons from formal RCA, we could further invest in the employment of integrated formal
methods in RAS assurance and certification to prevent field incidents, major product recalls, and overly lengthy
root cause investigations.
4.3 The Desire of Assurance to Form a Mature Discipline
In his Turing Award acceptance speech in 1981, Tony Hoare reviewed type safety precautions in programming lan-
guages and concluded: “In any respectable branch of engineering, failure to observe such elementary precautions
would have long been against the law” [85].
Inspired by this comparison, it can be helpful to look at other engineering disciplines such as civil, mechanical,
or electrical engineering to identify transfer opportunities for iFMs. There, engineers use FMs in many of their
critical tasks. However, nowadays these methods are often hidden behind powerful software tools usable by qualified
professional engineers. Although type systems, run-time bounds checking, and other variants of assertion checking
have been frequently used in dependable systems practice, the overall level of FM adoption is still comparatively low.
For example, even in less critical mechanical engineering domains, vocationally trained engineers use computer-aided
engineering, design, and manufacturing software. Whether for designing machine parts for serial production (i.e.,
specification) or for calculations (e.g. dimensioning, force or material flow simulations) for these parts and their
assembly (i.e., for prototype verification), these engineers use tools based on canonical mathematical models.
Nowadays, drawings from computer-aided mechanical design carry at least two types of semantics: one declarative
based on calculus for dimensioning (1), and one procedural for the synthesis of Computer-Numerical-Control pro-
grams for production machines processing materials to realise the drawings (2). Note that the unifying base of these
14National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, https://www.nhtsa.gov.
15National Transportation Safety Board, https://www.ntsb.gov.
16These experts have experience with tool qualification (1) and safety-critical systems in aviation (3), railway (1), automotive (4),
and energy systems & turbines (1). We have to keep their names confidential.
17From personal communication.
18See expert interview by embedded software journalist from EE Times in 2013 on
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc id=1319903&page number=1.
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two semantics is geometry, a well-studied mathematical discipline. Although higher levels of complexity demand
more sophisticated analytical expertise, typically from engineers with several years of work experience, many tasks
can be accomplished by less trained engineers using the corresponding tools.
Whereas in computer-aided mechanical design both semantics seem to be used to a similar extent, in DA we observe
that analogous semantics are rarely used even if tools are available, and less often we see (1) and (2) being consistently
used. Low adoption might result from the semantics for dimensioning and production automation being usually less
abstract than the semantics for verification (1) and synthesis (2) of computer programs. Accordingly, Parnas suggests
a shift from correctness proof to property calculation to develop practical formal methods [146, p. 33].
Patterns have had a long history in many disciplines. In mechanical engineering, patterns are better known as ma-
chine elements and are particularly useful in high-reliability applications. Machine elements (and standardised forms
thereof) have a stabilising impact on the outcome of an engineering project. The process of element selection and com-
position can take tremendous advantage not only from the reuse of proven design knowledge but also from the reuse of
complex calculations (e.g. from gear transmissions, injection moulding tools, skeleton framings). Moreover, modern
tools typically foster the use of element libraries and parametric design. Importantly, because the properties of such
elements are in many cases well known, calculations for assemblies (i.e., compositional verification) get relatively
easy. However, the higher the required precision of these calculations, the more expensive is their computation.
These observations are in line with what we know from collaborations in robotics, like mechatronics, a discipline where
many engineering domains have to play together well: FMs are heavily used for the analysis of robot controllers and
for various kinds of simulations and tests [121, 128].
Digital circuit engineering is a domain where FMs such as model checking have been successfully applied decades
ago. However, systematic hardware errors, such as Spectre and Meltdown, and the unavailability of temporal spec-
ifications of optimised operations (e.g. branch-prediction and speculative execution) discontinue the verifiability of
recent computer architectures. This lack of verifiability of the assumptions (e.g. partitioning, information flow) about
the execution platform complicates the verifiability of the software (e.g. an operating system) running on such a
platform.19
Opportunity 3 Dependability assurance has not yet successfully adopted iFMs as a vital part of their key
methodologies. If FMs seem relatively well established in other disciplines, we might also be able to successfully
transfer iFMs to RAS assurance and assurance in other domains. Beyond software design patterns, we could
benefit from best practices in formal specification and development manifested in repositories of FM patterns.
Moreover, we could aim at the further unification of established FMs to provide common formal semantics for
various domains.
4.4 The Desire for Adequate and Dependable Norms
Dependable systems practice usually includes the transition from what is called the system specification to an artefact
called system design. Typically, software and hardware specifications are then derived from these two artefacts before
delving into detailed technology choice and development. Jackson et al. [96, p. 48] observe that safety culture in such
a framework is more important than strict standards, but adequate standards and certification regimes can establish and
strengthen the safety culture desirable in dependable systems practice.
A striking finding in one of our recent discussions of dependable systems standards (e.g. IEC 61508, ISO 26262,20
DO-178C) is that normative parts for specification (i.e., requirements engineering), for specification validation (i.e.,
avoiding and handling requirements errors), and for hazard and risk analysis (particularly in early process stages)
seem to be below the state of the art [47, 60], despite several observations that significant portions [e.g. 44%, 78] of
the causes of safety-critical software-related incidents fall into the category of specification errors [108, 109].
If one identifies an error in the software specification, do causes of this error originate from an erroneous system
specification? How are system, software, and hardware specifications (formally) related? Control software typically
governs the behaviour of a whole machine. Hence, core components of a software specification might, modulo an
input/output relation [148], very well govern the narrative of the overall system specification. Inspired by the issue
of specification validity as highlighted in [101], do these standards provide guidance for checking the validity and
consistency of core parts of system, software, and hardware specifications?
The literature provides plenty of evidence of undesired impacts of specification errors dating back as early as the
investigations of Lutz [123] and Endres [40]. As reported by MacKenzie [124], the 92% of computer-related field
19See blog post on the seL4 microkernel, https://research.csiro.au/tsblog/crisis-security-vs-performance/.
20For: Road Vehicles – Functional Safety.
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incidents caused by human-computer interaction also illustrate the gap between specifications and capabilities of
humans to interact with automation. Despite these older figures, we are talking of one of the most critical parts of
standards. Practitioners could expect to receive strong guidance from these parts. Moreover, the requirements to show
conformance to these parts should not be vacuous.
Many standards define specific sets of requirements (i.e., for error removal and fault-tolerance) depending on the
level of risk a system (or any part of it) might cause. The higher this level, the more demanding these requirements.
Examples of demanding requirements include safety integrity level (SIL) 3-4 (IEC 61508), automotive safety integrity
level (ASIL) C-D (ISO 26262), systematic capability 3-4 (IEC 61508), design assurance level (DAL) A-B (DO-178C).
Even for the highest such levels the mentioned standards only “highly recommend” but not mandate the use of FMs.
Guidelines for embedded software development such as MISRA:1994 [138] recommend FMs for SIL 4, although
MISRA:2004 no longer includes such information and instead refers back21 to MISRA:1994. As already mentioned,
ISO 26262 as the overriding standard does not go beyond high recommendation of FMs for ASIL D. Koopman [111]
reported in 2014 that, in the US, car manufacturers are not required to follow MISRA and that there are no other
software certification requirements. This currently also applies to autonomous road vehicles.
In an interesting anecdote, Ladkin reported on his lack of success in introducing systematic hazard (and risk) anal-
ysis methodology into normative parts of this standard [115]. Moreover, he mentioned22 unsuccessful attempts to
strengthen the role of FMs in IEC 61508 and on the “broken standardisation” in assurance practice. In reaction to
that, he proposed the use of evidently independent peer reviews to “dampen committee-capture by big-company bully
players”.
Additionally, Knight [109] observed: “There is an expectation by the community that standards will embody the best
available technology and that their presentation will allow determination of conformance to be fairly straightforward.
A criticism that is seldom heard is that some standards are, in fact, technically flawed and poorly presented.” He
exemplifies his critique by several issues with IEC 61508 and RTCA DO-178B and suggests to make the meaning of
“conformance [or compliance] with a standard” more rigorous. Particularly, he encourages to replace indirect (i.e.,
process-related) evidence (e.g. documentation of specification activities) in assurance cases by direct (i.e., artefact-
related) evidence (e.g. unsuccessful checks for presence of certain specification faults, successful checks for absence
of implementation errors).23 With the observation in software quality control that “there is little evidence that confor-
mance to process standards guarantees good products”, Kitchenham and Pfleeger [106] delivered a reasonable basis
for Knight’s suggestions.
Regarding the integration of dependability approaches and FMs, Bowen and Stavridou [18] had stated by 1993 that
they “do not know how to combine formal methods assurance with metrics collected from other techniques such
as fault-tolerance”. Is this still an issue? From a practical viewpoint, standards such as, for example, IEC 61508,
ISO 26262, and DO-178C, provide recommendations about techniques for the reduction of both random hardware
failures (e.g. by fault-tolerance techniques) and systematic hardware and software failures (e.g. by FMs, static anal-
ysis, and testing). If iFMs can support the combined application of the recommended techniques and achieve an
improvement in practice then we should really strive to demonstrate this.
We believe that critical fractions of strong direct evidence can be delivered through the use of FMs. In support of
Feitelson’s argument [47], we see a great opportunity for an assessment of how the corresponding guidelines in these
standards can be extended and aligned with recent results in FM research.
Opportunity 4 We as researchers and practitioners could support the creation of adequate state-of-the-art reg-
ulations with improved guidance on specification construction and validation. That way, we could foster well-
certified high-risk software in a time where dangerous autonomous machines are about to get widely deployed in
our society.
5 Threats to the Adoption of Integrated Formal Methods
This section closes the environmental part of our SWOT analysis by identifying threats to FM transfer as well as
challenges that arise from alternative or competing approaches taking the opportunities mentioned in Section 4. We
also outline remedies to these threats.
21This might also the case for MISRA:2012 from March 2013. We are unaware of the opposite but were also unable to receive a
copy of this version.
22See System Safety Mailing List message from 4/11/2018, http://www.systemsafetylist.org/4183.htm and [116].
23While formal verification serves the check of absence of property violations, conventional testing can only serve as a check of
presence of such violations.
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The development of effective iFMs and their successful transfer into practice can be impeded by
• a lack of agreement on a sound semantic base for domain-specific and cross-domain FM integration (Sec-
tions 5.1 and 5.2),
• missing support for widely used and established tools (Section 5.2),
• a lack of interest in practical problems on the side of FM researchers (Section 5.3),
• a lack of incentives for FM researchers to engage with current practice and for software practitioners to
engage with recent theoretical results (Section 5.3),
• a bad reputation among practitioners and applied researchers (Section 5.3),
• proofs that are faulty or do not scale (Section 5.4),
• the quest for soundness overriding the quest for usefulness (Section 5.5).
We discuss these threats and barriers in more detail in the following.
5.1 Difficulties and Misconceptions of Unification
According to Broy [22], the successes and failures of semi-formal languages (e.g. UML, SysML) suggest that FMs,
once wrapped in FM-based tools, get exposed to the quest for a unified syntax, one main objective of the UML
movement in the 1990s. Rather than a unified syntax, it is more desirable to have a unified semantics and several
well-defined mappings to domain-specific syntax wherever convenient (Section 3.5). This approach is occasionally
taken up by DSLs in MDE (Section 3.2). Harel and Rumpe [74] argued that one cannot achieve proper integration of
methods and notations without a unifying semantics. This argument carries over to the problem of tool integration as
already discussed in Section 3.5 and revisited below. Particularly, the following challenges apply to FMs when used
in MDE:
1. the maintenance of a single source of information serving in the (automated) derivation of downstream arte-
facts (e.g. proof results, code via synthesis) [134],
2. a clear mapping between the DSL presented to the engineer (using intuitive notation) and the DSL semantics
serving as the basis of formal verification,
3. the embedding of a lean domain-specific formalism into a common data model [25] suitable for access and
manipulation by engineers through their various tools [61].
These challenges are complicated by irreducible unidirectionalities in automated transformations (e.g. model-to-code)
limiting the desirable round-trip engineering [167] (i.e., the change between views of the same data).
We discussed SACM [172] as an assurance DSL in Section 4.1. Likewise, architecture description languages (e.g.
the Architecture Analysis & Design Language [46], EAST-ADL [36]) are DSLs for overall embedded system design.
DSLs can be seen as one shortcut to the still ongoing efforts of arriving at a reduced version or a variant of UMLwhere
a semantics can be defined for the whole language [e.g. 153].
At a higher level of abstraction, so-called architecture frameworks (cf. ISO 42010, e.g. the Department of Defense
Architecture Framework) and artefact and traceability models [e.g. 155, 174] have been proposed, aiming at the
standardisation of specific parts of the systems and software engineering life-cycle and of the documentation and data
models used there. These frameworks andmodels are similar to the models used in product data/life-cyclemanagement
in fields like mechanical or civil engineering.
To our best knowledge, no cross-disciplinary semantic unification has been undertaken yet (see Section 3.5), serving
as a basis for dependable systems engineering. Although many of these approaches have not been developed with
the aim of formalisation and the unification of semantics, we believe that this effort has to be made when developing
powerful iFMs.
Threat 1 The main threat is the lack of agreement on a sound semantic base for domain-specific and cross-
domain iFMs.
Remedy 1 To reduce this threat, FM integration and refinement-based software engineering could be better
aligned with artefact models [e.g. 127, 174]. This alignment may foster the unification of formal semantics
to strengthen traceability among the artefacts and to aid in a variety of change impact analysis tasks in the
engineering process [e.g. 23, 170].
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5.2 Reluctant Integration Culture and Legacy Processes
Tool integration is about the integration of engineering information technology, for example, tools for requirements
specification, computer-aided software engineering, and computer-aided mechanical design. Among the wide variety
of solutions to capture and track model data, the majority deals with linking or merging data models [61] in one
or another shallow way (e.g. software repositories, data exchange formats, product/engineering/application data or
life-cycle management systems).
Some tools with sustainable support are heavyweight, making it difficult to agree on lean model semantics, while others
are proprietary, accompanied with interest in hiding model semantics. The surveys of Liebel et al. [119, pp. 102,104],
Mohagheghi et al. [134, p. 104], and Akdur et al. [3] confirm that method and model integration have not yet been
solved in MBD, MDE, and dependable systems practice. Moreover, frequent proposals by researchers [e.g. 20, 54,
153] to formalise fragments or variants of UML and SysML have not yet received wide attention by practitioners and
standardisation authorities.
DSL-based integrated development environments (e.g. using Xtext and Sirius) get close to what is suitable for FM-
based tools. Such tools rely on a trusted representation of the formal semantics integrating the model data. For
successful iFM transfer to assurance practice, tools need to be built on a lean and open central system model [e.g.
5, 95].
An even greater barrier than loosely integrated tools are legacy language and modelling paradigms, an established tool
and method market carried by legacy stakeholders and, possibly, a neglected continuous improvement of FM education
and training.
Threat 2 The main threat is discontinuous and disintegrated FM education, transfer, and tool development.
Remedy 2 To reduce this threat, continuous adaptation and improvement of education through teaching, of
transfer through training, application, and feedback, and of tool development through regulated interface stan-
dards are necessary.
5.3 Reluctant Transfer Culture and Exaggerated Scepticism
Finally, the vision of introducing iFMs into assurance practice might be hindered by a lack of FM researchers able
or willing to engage with industrial assurance practice, as diagnosed by Woodcock et al. [177]. It is certainly hard
work to collect sufficient evidence for FM effectiveness in assurance practice because of intellectual property rights
and other legal issues but also because of a lack of awareness among FM researchers [177]. However, for credible
method comparison experiments, Jones and Bonsignour [100] recommended a sample of 20 similar projects split into
two groups, 10 projects without treatment (i.e., not using FMs) and 10 projects with treatment (i.e., using FMs) to
establish strong evidence (i.e., evidence of level 5 or above [65]).
Exaggerated scepticism on the side of practitioners and applied researchers that has piled up over the years might be
the most important barrier to cross. Early failures to meet high expectations on FMs and FM transfer might have led to
what can be called an “FMWinter”. However, we think crossing a few other barriers first might make it easier to cope
with scepticism in the assurance community and initiate an “FM Spring”, at least in assurance practice. The recent
successes with FMs for certification of commercial medical devices [75, 126], and the associated burgeoning field of
FMs for HCI [173], are examples that could help to overcome this scepticism. Moreover, their is potential for transfer
of these results to RAS engineering, where the need for safety assured HCI is also paramount [112, 114].
Threat 3 The main threat is the reluctance of FM researchers to regularly engage in transfer efforts combined
with an exaggerated scepticism of practitioners and with other mechanisms (e.g. lack of funding, poorly focused
research evaluation, intellectual property rights) preventing both sides from engaging in an effective bidirectional
transfer.
Remedy 3 To reduce this threat, building awareness among researchers as well as stronger incentives (e.g.
regulation) to provide continuous transfer funding for FM research (e.g. not relying on short-term projects like
PhD theses) is needed. A good start on the academic side could then be a specific standardised repository of FM
case studies.
5.4 Too Many Errors in Proofs and Failure to Scale
From the perspective of measurement, Jones and Bonsignour [100, Sec. 4.1] stated that “proofs of correctness sound
useful, but [i] errors in the proofs themselves seem to be common failings not covered by the literature. Further, large
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applications may have thousands of provable algorithms, and [ii] the time required to prove them all might take many
years”. For [i], the authors opposed 7% of erroneous bug repairs to up to 100% of erroneous proofs, though stating that
the latter was based on an anecdote and there had been little data around. Jones and Bonsignour elaborated an example
for [ii]: Assuming one provable algorithm per 5 function points24 and on average 4 proofs per day, MicrosoftWindows
7 (160,000 function points) would have about 32,000 provable algorithms, taking a qualified software engineer about
36 calendar years. They highlighted that typically only around 5% of the personnel are trained to do this work,
assuming that algorithms and requirements are stable during proof time.
Jones and Bonsignour’s argument is based on the view of practical program verification as a largely manual activity.
However, research in reasoning about programs has devised promising approaches to proof automation (e.g. bounded
model checkers, interactive proof assistants). Assessing such approaches, MacKenzie [125] compared rigorous but
manual formal proof with mechanised or automated proof. He could not find a case where mechanised proof threw
doubt upon an established mathematical theorem. MacKenzie observed that this underpins the robustness argument
of De Millo et al. [35] for proofs as manual social processes rather than lengthy mechanical derivations (cf. Sec-
tion 3.3). However, opposing De Millo et al.’s view, Jones [101, p. 38] concluded that structuring of knowledge about
computing ideas is the actual issue, and not the avoidance of mechanisation. Furthermore, Jones [101, p. 39] miti-
gated Fetzer’s issue of the reality gap in program verification [48] by referring to researchers’ continuous efforts in
verifying hardware, programming languages, and compilers in addition to individual programs. Finally, in support of
Jones and Bonsignour’s concerns, Jones [101, p. 38] highlighted the validity of specifications, manual and automated
proofs rely on, as a serious issue indeed having received too little attention from researchers (cf. Section 4.4).
Threat 4 The main threat is the lack of qualified personnel to cope with the required amount and type of proof.
Remedy 4 We believe, one angle of attacking this threat is the use of proof assistants well-integrated with com-
mon environments for requirements specification and software development combined with continuous research
and education in the corresponding methods and tools.
5.5 Failure to Derive Useful Tools
Being loosely related to erroneous proofs, the information overload through false-positive findings of errors is a well-
known problem in static program analysis. Semi-formal pattern checkers,25 such as PMD and FindBugs, are exposed
to this threat [58]. Additionally, FM-based verification tools, such as Terminator and ESC/Java [49], can be unable
to correctly report all potential problems, because they are bounded and therefore unsound. While such tools can be
helpful, confronting developers with many irrelevant findings (i.e., false positives) or a high risk of critical misses (i.e.,
false negatives) can lead to decreased use of FM-based tools.
Figure 2 relates the two information retrieval metrics, precision and recall, with two adequacy criteria of proof calculi,
soundness and completeness. Precision denotes the ratio of actual (solid circle) to correct (true positive findings in the
hashed area) findings, while recall measures the ratio of correct to all theoretically correct (dotted circle) findings. The
ideal value for both metrics is 1, meaning that there are only true negatives and true positives. Completeness, although
unachievable for richer theories, would correspond to recall and soundness would correspond to a precision of 1.
On the one hand, the usefulness of the calculi underlying FMs is directly proportional only to their completeness
and (traditionally) expires with a precision of less than 1. In other words, we usually try to avoid calculi that allow the
derivation of false theorems. On the other hand, semi-formal pattern checkers have shown to have a wide, sometimes
unacceptable, range of precision and recall of their findings. The usefulness of practical FM-based tools might lie
somewhere in the middle between classical calculi and bug finding tools with poor precision/recall values.
Threat 5 The main threat is the struggle of academia and tool vendors to provide adequate tools, suited to adapt
to novel scientific insights, to be integrated with other tools, and to be maintained in a flexible and independent
manner.
Remedy 5 To reduce this threat, an improvement of education and strong incentives can play an important role
here (cf. Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
24A function point is a measure of the conceptual complexity of an IT system relevant for the estimation of the amount of work
required to engineer this system.
25Also called bug finding tools.
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Figure 2: Precision and recall versus soundness and completeness in program verification
6 A Vision of Integrated Formal Methods for Assurance
The following discussion applies to many domains of dependability assurance. However, the complexity of robots
and autonomous systems forms a key opportunity for the progress of iFM research and for its successful transfer.
Accordingly, Table 1 summarises the discussion in Sections 3 to 5 with an interpretation into RAS assurance practice.
Based on the strengths and opportunities described in the Sections 3 and 4, we formulate our vision in terms of working
hypotheses:
(H1) From Section 4.1: Software tools for the construction of arguments and production of evidence using iFMs
can meet the challenge of assuring RAS safe. Computer-assisted assurance cases supported by heterogeneous
formal models will increase confidence in their sufficiency, and also aid in maintenance and evolution through
modularisation of arguments and evidence.
(H2) From Sections 4.1 and 4.3: iFMs, in particular modern verification tools, will enable automation of the
evidence gathering process, and highlight potential problems when an assurance case changes or when an
incident occurs.
(H3) From Sections 4.1 and 4.3: There is no stable path to assured autonomy without the use of iFMs. Acceptable
safety will be much more likely achieved with iFMs than without them.
(H4) From Section 3.5: The success of iFMs depends on the ability to integrate a variety of FMs for different
aspects of RAS (e.g. HCI, safety-security interaction, missing human fallback, environment/worldmodelling,
uncertain prediction/behaviour), which is not currently possible.
(H5) From Sections 3.4 and 3.5: Sophisticated techniques formodel integration and synchronisation are necessary
to support MDE with iFMs. This way, iFMs will make it easier to express consistent RAS models covering
all relevant aspects, make their modelling assumptions explicit, and improve future assurance practices.
(H6) From Sections 3.1 to 3.3 and 5.3: iFMs can be beneficial in the short term. However, an important engineering
principle is to be conservative [150] and, therefore, not to change procedures unless there is compelling
evidence that iFMs are effective. Such evidence can be delivered through empirical research [e.g. 98, 151,
163, 177] and collaboration of academia and industry. That evidence is required to re-evaluate research and
foster research progress and transfer.
(H7) From Section 4.2: The demonstration of cost effectiveness in addition to technical effectiveness of new iFMs
is necessary to justify further research.
(H8) From Section 4.4: Norms are a lever of public interest in dependability [47]. Current norms seem to deviate
from the state of the art and may fail to guarantee product certification procedures that satisfy the public
interest.
Figure 3 assigns these hypotheses to the relationships between foundational and transfer-directed iFM research by
example of the RAS domain. Overall, we believe that iFMs have great potential and can improve assurance but
practitioners do not use them accordingly.
Opportunity 5 We could take and enhance credible measures to convince assurance practitioners of our results
and effectively transfer these results. For this to happen, we have to answer further research questions.
7 Empirical, Applied, and Foundational Research
Based on the aforementioned working hypotheses, we state several objectives for foundational and transfer-directed
iFM research, formulate research questions, and show our expectations on desirable outcomes of such research.
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Table 1: Overview of our SWOT analysis [152] of “iFMs in practical RAS assurance”
Method Strengths: iFMs raise the potential of . . .
• improvement of RAS models, specification of RAS
requirements, automation of RAS verification (Sec-
tion 3.1)
• early detection of systematic errors in RAS de-
signs (Section 3.1)
• helpful abstractions to inform engineers about criti-
cal RAS properties (Section 3.4)
• integration and coordination of several FMs to
consistently reason about interrelated RAS proper-
ties (Section 3.5)
Community Strengths: iFM research can rely on . . .
• many transfer re-entry points from former FM case
studies in industrial and academic labs (Section 3.2)
• many assurance practitioners who perceive FM use-
fulness as positive (Section 3.1)
• research designs for comparative studies of FM ef-
fectiveness (Section 3.3)
Method Weaknesses: FMs have suffered from . . .
• being difficult to learn and apply, many assurance
practitioners perceive ease of use of FMs as nega-
tive (Section 3.1)
• low effectiveness of formal models because of the
reality gap (Section 3.4)
• fragile effectiveness and productivity in RAS engi-
neering (Section 3.3)
Community Weaknesses: iFM progress has been ham-
pered by . . .
• no agreed framework for integration of FMs (Sec-
tion 3.5)
• lack of convincing evidence of FM effectiveness in
RAS engineering (Section 3.3)
• research ineffectively communicated in iFM teach-
ing/training (Section 3.1)
Key Opportunities for iFM transfer and progress:
• The desire for early removal of erroneous RAS be-
haviour and model-based assurance (Section 4.1)
• The desire to learn from RAS accidents and their
root causes (Section 4.2)
• The desire of RAS assurance to be a mature disci-
pline (Section 4.3)
• The desire for adequate and dependable RAS
norms (Section 4.4)
The analysis provided in this table is an enhancement of the
general analysis in Table 3 in Appendix B.
Method Threats: iFM research is threatened by . . .
• misconceptions of semantic unification in RAS as-
surance (Section 5.1)
• iFMs not scaling up to industry-size RASs (Sec-
tion 5.4)
• faulty, tedious, or vacuous proofs (Sections 5.4
and 5.5)
• poor integration with RAS engineering tools, pro-
cesses, and education (Sections 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5)
Transfer Threats: iFM transfer is threatened by . . .
• a lack of roboticists’ education in iFMs (Sections 5.2
and 5.4)
• a lack of iFM researcher engagement in transfer to
RAS practice (Section 5.3)
• a lack of comprehensive access to quality data from
RAS practice (Section 5.3)
7.1 Research Objectives and Tasks
To validate and transfer our research results, we need to
• evaluate how assurance case construction and management for certifiable RASs can be improved by
iFMs [57].
• debunk or justify arguments against the use of FMs or FM-based tools in RAS assurance.
• foster a culture of successful FM research transfer to industries performing RAS assurance.
Taking an iFM foundational point of view, we need
• foundational research on the integration and unification of FMs to tackle the complexity of RASs [45].
• a unified semantic foundation for the plethora of notations in RAS assurance, to enable method and tool
integration. There are a number of promising research directions still being investigated [89, 158].
Taking an evidence-based point of view, as already highlighted in 1993 by Bowen and Stavridou [18], we need to
• understand the difference between the state of assurance practice and assurance research.
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Figure 3: Progress of research on integrated formal methods through transfer into and improvement of assurance
practice of robots and autonomous systems
• understand in which ways current RAS assurance practices fail, and suggest effective approaches from assur-
ance research. In this way, we can be sure that assurance practice is equipped with state-of-the-art assurance
technology for defence against potential liability claims, and that assurance practitioners do not fail in fulfill-
ing their obligations.
• understand how results from assurance research can be validated to be sure that research follows promising
directions with high potential of success in assurance practice.
Based on that, we need to
• set concrete directions for empirical FM research in RAS assurance.
• train FM researchers in applying empirical research designs in their work on rigorous assurance cases. Wood-
cock et al. [177] corroborated this objective by saying that “formal methods champions need to be aware of
the need to measure costs”.
• avoid biases as found in various branches of scientific research. For example, in the social and biomedical
sciences, researchers identified such biases through meta-analyses and suggested measures for bias avoid-
ance [e.g. 44, 50].
• increase the level of evidence of FM research to level 2 according to the hierarchy in [65, Tab. 2].
• avoid knowledge gaps about whether (a) RAS practice is keeping up with the state of the assurance art, and
(b) whether recent academic or industrial research is going in the right direction. In this way, we can be sure
that we do our best to inform and serve the society.
Using appropriate research designs, we need to
• invite the RAS industry to enhance their efforts in engaging with recent iFM research.
• foster goal-oriented interaction (a) between assurance practitioners and researchers and (b) between FM re-
searchers and assurance researchers. In this way, we can be sure to do everything to keep researchers up to
date with respect to practical demands.
• join the FM research and applied assurance research communities (Figure 1 on page 3), both vital for the
progress and transfer of assurance research into RAS assurance practice. This way, we can be sure to foster
necessary knowledge transfer between these two communities.
• summarise achievements in practical applications of iFMs for constructing assurance cases.
• suggest improvements of curricula for RAS assurance.
• guide the RAS industry in process improvement, training, and tool support.
• guide vendors of FM-based assurance tools to assess and improve their tools and services.
7.2 Some Research Questions addressing these Objectives
The research questions below are relevant for FMs in general. We consider these questions as crucial to be answered
for RAS assurance to address the aforementioned objectives:
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(Q1) What is the true extent of computer-related accidents up to 2019 [124]? What would these figures mean for
the RAS domain?
(Q2) Does the use of formalism detect severe errors to a larger extent than without the use of formalism [151, 163]?
(Q3) Does the use of formalism detect severe errors earlier than without using formalism?
(Q4) Why would such errors be a compelling argument for the use of FMs?
(Q5) Apart from error avoidance and removal, which other benefits of iFMs in practice are evident and can be
utilised for method trade-offs?
(Q6) Which criteria play a central role in measuring iFM effectiveness? Particularly, how can FM-based tools be
used at scale?
(Q7) How would Commercial-off-the-Shelf and System-Element-out-of-Context verification by iFMs pay off?
(Q8) Which hurdles need to be overcome to use iFMs in practice to the maximum benefit?
(Q9) How do we know when these hurdles are actually overcome?
(Q10) How can FMs (from different disciplines) be used together (iFMs, unification)?
(Q11) How can FMs be used to assure systems (e.g. computer vision in road vehicles) involving artificial intelli-
gence (AI) techniques like machine learning and deep neural networks?
(Q12) How can FMs be integrated into assurance cases to support certification against international safety and
security standards?
(Q13) How can we best combine formal and informal methods? For example, how can we deal with the issue of the
validity of specifications that proofs rely on [101].
(Q14) How can we best present formal requirements, evidence, and artefacts in an assurance case?
(Q15) How can empirical research help in successfully demonstrating the capabilities of iFMs for rigorous and
certifiable autonomy assurance?
This list of research questions can easily be extended by further more detailed empirical questions from the settings
discussed in [100, Sec. 4.4].
7.3 Some Envisaged Research Outcomes
Our vision of rigorous RAS assurance implies foundational iFM research to result in
• novel semantic frameworks unifying best practice methods, models, and formalisms established in RAS
• new concepts for iFM-based development environments
• new computational theories to support formal modelling and verification of RAS
• evaluations of
– assurance tools, languages, frameworks, or platforms used in practice regarding their support of iFMs
– the integration of iFMs into modelling and programming techniques, assurance methods, and assurance
processes
– languages for linking informal requirements with evidence from iFMs
– (automated) abstraction techniques used in assurance and certification
• opinions, positions, and visions on FM integration and unification for rigorous practical assurance.
Our vision of rigorous RAS assurance implies applied and empirical iFM research to result in
• comparisons of
– projects applying iFMs in assurance practice with similar practical projects applying non-iFM ap-
proaches
– iFM-based (embedded software) assurance with assurance approaches in traditional engineering disci-
plines
• checklists, metrics, and benchmarks (for and beyond tool performance) for
– the evaluation and comparison of iFM-based assurance approaches (e.g. confidence level)
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– relating error removal and incident root cause data (e.g. efficiency and effectiveness in removal of severe
errors or in avoidance of severe accidents, cf. [124])
– usability and maturity assessment of iFMs (e.g. abstraction effort, proof complexity, assurance case
complexity, productivity)
– the evaluation of FM budget cases (cf. [33] in electronic hardware development).
• experiences in or surveys (e.g. systematic mappings and reviews of assurance case research, interview studies
with assurance practitioners, cf. Appendix A) of
– iFM transfers and applications (e.g. case studies in assurance and certification projects)
– challenges, limitations/barriers, and benefits of iFMs in assurance and certification projects,
• research designs (e.g. for controlled field experiments) for the practical validation of iFMs in assurance and
certification projects
• opinions, positions, and visions on future research, education, and training in the use of iFMs in assurance
and certification.
8 Summary
Along the lines of Hoare et al. [90], we analysed strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to determine the
potential of integrated formal methods to improve the practice of dependability assurance. Emphasising robots and
autonomous systems as an area in the spotlight of dependability assurance, we express our expectations of research
progress and transfer. From these expectations, we derived a research and research transfer agenda with the objective
of (i) enhancing the foundations of integrated formalmethods, (ii) collecting evidence on the effectiveness of integrated
formal methods in practice, (iii) successfully transferring integrated formal methods into the assurance practice, with
a short-term focus on robots and autonomous systems, and (iv) fostering research progress, education, and training
from the results of this transfer effort.
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Appendix
A Studying Formal Method Practitioners: A Ballpark Figure
In this section, we make a brief excursion to the relationship between FMs and formal inspection (FI), closing with
a rough estimate of the size of the population of FM users and the meaning of such an estimate for the empirical
study of that population. Such studies include cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys based on questionnaires or
semi-structured interviews.
Formal Inspection versus Formal Methods FI encompasses a variety of techniques (e.g. peer reviews, walk-
throughs) where critical process artefacts (e.g. program code) are checked (e.g. manually or using software tools)
against a variety of criteria (e.g. checklists), usually by a group of independent qualified engineers. For the sake of
simplicity of the following discussion, we assume that FMs can be seen as a particularly rigorous variant of FI where
formal specifications serve as a particular way of formulating checklists.
We compare the use of FMs with the use of FI. According to Jones and Bonsignour [100, Sec. 4.4], formal inspections
are used in more than 35% of commercial defence, systems, and embedded software projects, and FMs are estimated
to be applied in less than 1% of overall commercial software engineering projects. To get an idea of this coverage data,
we perform an analysis of the global embedded software market based on other global software market indicators in
Table 2. We found estimates of systems and software professionals world-wide and estimates of annual US business
values.27
A uniform distribution would entail roughly 37000 USD/year per person in the general software domain and 10000
USD/year per person in the embedded software domain. Clearly, geographically strongly differing salaries and part-
time engagement rule out a uniform distribution, yet providing figures helpful for our purposes.
Next, we apply the following proportions: From a worldwide population of around 18.5 million software developers in
2014 [43], about 19% live in the US, 10% in China, 9.8% in India, 36% Asia/Pacific region, 39 % live in Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa; and 30% in the Americas.28 The design to quality assurance (i.e., verification and test) cost
ratio is observed to be approximately 30 : 70.29 About 20% of embedded software personnel are quality assurance
engineers (i.e., test, verification, or validation engineers).30
The estimates in Table 2 suggest that around 2% of the overall pure software market are allocated to the embedded pure
software market. 35% coverage of formal inspection in about 13.5%of the overall software market (161/(689+515) =
0.134) would result in roughly 4.7% coverage of all software projects by formal inspection versus at most 1% coverage
by FMs. However, from this data we can hardly know whether rates of FM use get close to or beyond 10% in high-
criticality systems projects.
Assuming that in about 35% of embedded software projects the quality assurance personnel would use formal inspec-
tion and that in every fifth (1 : 4.7) of such projects formal methods would be used, the current population of regular
practical FM users would globally amount to about 5040 (= 72, 000 ∗ 0.34 ∗ 0.20) persons. Note that these numbers
are rough estimates. However, we believe their order of magnitude is realistic. Given that these persons would on
average earn about 100,000 USD/year each, we would speak of an annual business value of around USD 504 million.
Empirical Studies of FI and FM Practitioners Importantly, from these data we can determine minimum sample
sizes for surveys. For example, assume we want to have 95% confidence in our test results and are fine with a
confidence interval of ±7%. Then, for regular practical FM users, a population of the size of 5040 persons would
require us to sample 189 independent data points (e.g. questionnaire responses). The population of regular practical
FI users, 25200 (= 72, 000 ∗ .35) would imply a minimum sample size of 194.
For any sample of such size, any survey has to argue why the sample represents the population. This step depends on
the possibilities given during the sampling stage. Obviously, reaching out to 189 out of 5040 persons whose locations
might be largely unknown is an extremely difficult task that might only be tackled in terms of a global group effort
among researchers and practitioners. Given that this challenge can be tackled, these figures determine the type of
surveys required for the collection of confident evidence. Moreover, these figures limit the manual effort to perform
and repeat valuable qualitative studies to a reasonable amount.
27See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software industry and https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/18959/what-proportion-of-programming-is-done-for-embedded-systems.
28See https://adtmag.com/Blogs/WatersWorks/2014/01/Worldwide-Developer-Count.aspx.
29See https://www.slideshare.net/pboulet/socdesign.
30See https://de.slideshare.net/vdcresearch/searching-for-the-total-size-of-the-embedded-software-engineering-market.
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Table 2: Data for the estimation of the size of the formal inspection and formal method market
Global market/project indi-
cators [Unit]
Professional
engineers /
developers
[million]
Ann. busi-
ness value
[billion
USD/year]
Quality
assurance
personnel
[million]
QA busi-
ness value
[billion
USD/year]
FI [%] FM [%] Devices
[billion /
year]
General IT hardware and
devices (incl. personal
computers)
2018: 689 2010: 10
Embedded systems (hard-
ware, software, connected
embedded devices) in all
domains
2014: 1.2 2009: 88
2018:
(161)a
(35) 2010: 9.8
Industrial embedded sys-
tems
2016: 2
Defence, systems, and em-
bedded commercial soft-
ware engineering
2011: 35
Embedded software 2014: 0.36 2009: 3.4
2018: (10)
2010:
(0.072)
2010:
(2.38)
General software (overall
commercial software engi-
neering, development)
2014: 18.5
2018: 23
2019: 23.9
2013: 407
2018:
(515)
(4.6) 2011: 1
aThe numbers in parentheses include estimates for 2018 based on the other numbers and corresponding
average growth rates.
B Formal Methods in Dependable Systems Engineering
Figure 1 on page 3 depicts our research setting for this survey. There, we describe integrated formal method as an
enhancement of formal methods and the assurance of robots and autonomous systemss as a special field of depend-
able systems engineering. Because many of the discussed issues are of a more general nature, we first prepared a
SWOT analysis of FMs in dependable systems engineering in Table 3. Then, we refined this analysis in Table 1 to
accommodate specifics of integrated formal methods for robots and autonomous systems.
29
A PREPRINT - NOVEMBER 6, 2019
Table 3: Overview of our general SWOT analysis (according to Piercy and Giles [152]) of “formal methods in de-
pendable systems engineering”
Method Strengths:
• Improvement of modelling precision, requirements
clarity, verification confidence
• High error detection effectiveness, early error re-
moval
Community Strengths:
• Many transfer re-entry points from former case stud-
ies with industry
• Many dependable systems practitioners perceive
FM usefulness as positive
Method Weaknesses:
• Difficult to learn and apply, many dependable sys-
tems practitioners perceive ease of use of FMs as
negative
• Fragile effectiveness and productivity
Community Weaknesses:
• Lack of compelling evidence of FM effectiveness
• Ineffectively communicated in teaching and training
Key Opportunities for FM Transfer and Research:
• Desire for early removal of severe errors (Sec-
tion 4.1)
• Desire to learn from accidents and their root causes
(Section 4.2)
• Desire to be a mature discipline (Section 4.3)
• Desire for dependable norms (Section 4.4)
Method Threats:
• Lack of method scalability
• Faulty, tedious, or vacuous proofs
• Lack of user education
• Poor tool integration, legacy tools and processes
Transfer Threats:
• Lack of researcher engagement in FM transfer
• Lack of access to comprehensive high-quality data
30
